How does the opportunity or threat of cross-examination affect the behavior of parties seeking to influence an uninformed decision maker? How does it affect decision-making? Two opposed parties invest in acquiring information and select what to disclose. The decision maker then adjudicates. We compare this benchmark with a procedure allowing adversarial cross-examination. The cross-examiner tests the opponent in order to persuade the decision maker that the opponent is deceitful through withholding of information. We show that the quality of decision-making deteriorates because both parties are less likely to acquire information and because cross-examination too often makes the truth appear as falsehood. Next, we allow for controlled cross-examination by permitting the cross-examined to be re-examined by his own advocate. More information then reaches the decision maker. Depending on how examination is able to trade off type 1 and 2 errors, decision-making may or may not improve compared to the benchmark.