We propose a theory of populist “supply” as unconditional commitment. We show that
reduced trust in the ability and reliability of politicians and lower interest for the common
good is responsible for the demand of simple credible policies. Disenchanted citizens prefer
politicians who stick with their easy to check promises (committed delegates) to politicians
who insist in their competence to optimally address future problems (trustees). In a two-party
competition when moral polarization emerges between parties, voters with lower interest for
the common good select a committed delegate, while those with higher interest for the com-
mon good appoint a trustee. In this asymmetric equilibrium the commitment component of
populism is conducive to anti-elite rhetoric and fake news production incentives. National-
ism, closed border policies and protectionism are examples of commitment that reflect reduced
moral universalism. When the desire for simple commitments increases, voters' endogenous
political information can drastically drop.